We develop a model in which social pressure on a …rm to behave well is jointly produced by a state regulator (EPA) and an NGO. The EPA and NGO di¤er in how they trade-o¤ business versus environmental interests and also have access to di¤erent instruments in pursuit of their objectives. EPA and NGO e¤orts may be strategic complements or substitutes, depending upon circumstances. We present a taxonomy of outcomes in the game between EPA and NGO in the spirit of Fudenberg and Tirole's (1984) classic taxonomy of business strategies. We also consider strategic delegation from NGO supporters to an NGO that has tastes over environmental and business interests di¤erent to their own.
donation? One that is sensitive to business interests, or one that attaches little or no weight to them? In our framework we show that a citizen typically will not wish to support an NGO with the same objectives as his or her own. Rather, in general the citizen will understand that the citizen's ends are better served by delegating the …ghting of the battle to an NGO whose preferences over environmental versus non-environmental outcomes are systematically di¤erent in comparison to the preferences of the citizen.
In terms of the development of knowledge in this area the analysis allows us to speak to two questions. The …rst is how the roles of state enforcer and NGO …t together in a context in which compliance pressure is jointly produced, for instance settings in which social license to operate is important. The second relates to the question of what is the appropriate objective function with which to endow NGOs in our models. Existing models start with an ad hoc assumption about NGO objectives -usually based either on impact (for example Heyes and Martin (2015)) aggregate environmental damage (for example Heyes and Kapur (2012) ) or a variant there-on. Our approach endogenizes the objective function that the activist group seeks to maximize, deriving it from (but not equating it to) the tastes of donors.
The second element …ts into a wider literature on strategic delegation in other contexts.
In Rogo¤ (1985) a politician with a particular taste for in ‡ation and unemployment delegates control of monetary policy to a central banker more conservative (in ‡ation-hating) than the politician. In Vickers (1985) and Fershtman and Judd (1987) a pro…t-maximising shareholder delegates the running of the …rm to a chief who's objective function is not pro…t-maximization.
In Heyes and Kapur (2011) a welfare-maximizing government appoints an EPA chief who is not welfare-oriented. In each case the appointment is instrumental -it makes credible a pattern of responses in a subsequent game that is to the ultimate bene…t of the principal. In our setting the donor is the principal, and by donating to a particular NGO, the principal appoints that entity as agent to do the bidding on behalf of the principal.
The …rst complements a number of strands of research on the social behaviors of …rms.
There is a substantial body of theoretical and empirical research on corporate social responsibility (CSR) and behavior that goes beyond compliance (Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) and Pargal and Wheeler (1996) ). Related to this is the recent ‡urry of work on 'private politics' (Baron (2001 (Baron ( , 2009 ), Baron and Diermeier (2007) ). A second literature seeks to use formal methods to understand the organization and strategies of the social advocacy sector (Heyes and Martin (2015, 2016) , Aldashev and Verdier (2009) ). With particular focus on community pressure, Heyes and Kapur (2012) develop a model in which a …rm engages in CSR in order to maintain community support and/or to regain the support of the community once it has been lost. They characterize how these incentives interact with formal regulatory interventions. Aldashev and Verdier (2013) analyze the e¤ect of NGO pressure on industry equilibrium (intensity of competition, market structure, and the share of socially responsible …rms) and characterize the impact of industry-level changes (market size, consumer tastes) on NGO activism. Heyes and Maxwell (2004) model the interplay of a hypothetical World Environmental Organization and an NGO and …nd that lawsuits by private citizens crowd in public monitoring but crowd out public sanctions. Lambertini et al (2016) and PlanerFriedrich and Sahm (2017) outline a delegation approach to CSR. Walter and Chang (2017) analyse the welfare impacts of environmental regulations in the presence of green consumers.
And …nally, with an empirical focus Langpap and Shimshack (2010) present empirical evidence on the extent to which private environmental prosecutions crowd out -or crowd in -public monitoring and public enforcement e¤orts.
Joint Production of Social Pressure: Motivation and Model Preview
The starting point for the analysis that follows is the recognition that the pressure on …rms to behave well -informal regulatory pressure -is jointly produced by governmental and nongovernmental actors.
For the purposes of formal modeling we will treat these as single entities and refer to them generically as an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and a Non-governmental Organization (NGO). The EPA and NGO can be expected to have di¤erent objectives -the former pursuing welfare, the latter more interested in environmental outcomes -as well as di¤erent levers that they can use to further their aims.
A central assumption that we will make is that the EPA has the means to identify certain corporate behaviors, while the NGO in ‡uences public hostility to exposed bad behavior. Of course this will not be realistic in every setting, but is a reasonable approximation in many settings. 1 In our model we keep things stark. The EPA will choose the probability that bad behavior by a …rm is exposed. It might do this through: (1) conducting inspections and publishing results (NGOs do not have the same rights to access plants and conduct inspections that regulators do); (2) requiring submission of data from polluters and disseminating it; 1 The EPA may also have the power to levy …nancial penalties, but these penalties are often small compared to reputational losses (Heyes (2001) ). Equally too activist groups may in some contexts play a role in the detection of wrongdoing. For example in the recent VW emissions scandal it was an NGO that conducted the testing that bought the wrongdoing to light. Couttenier et al (2016) develop a model in which an NGO is selective in the information it passes on to citizens. In such a pure disclosure game the NGO does not expend e¤ort generating primary information, so presumably it often obtains the information that it has from governmental or other publicly available sources. For example, the International Council of Clean Transportation (ICCT) Ranking of Transatlantic Airline Fuel E¢ ciency, that the authors use as a motivating example in that paper, combines data from publicly available travel web-sites with data on fuel use and tra¢ c occupancy rates reported to the US Department of Transportation (see ICCT (2015) ). and/or (3) mandating direct disclosure by …rms of information about various elements of their social impact, or in other ways. The NGO will in ‡uence community attitudes to wrongdoing, including the hostility of the social 'atmosphere'; and therefore will in ‡uence the size of the social penalty a …rm su¤ers if its bad behavior is exposed. 2 This sort of division has been noted by researchers and practitioners in the environmental …eld: "Regulators are learning the value ... of NGOs to help achieve environmental goals. Information regulation strategies, for example, are explicitly designed to empower NGOs (give them the information they need) to impose informal sanctions on …rms based on their environmental record", (INECE (2005)). 3 The relationship between the NGO and EPA is symbiotic -they need each other.
To summarize the assumption in a phrase: In our model the EPA does the naming, the NGO does the shaming. To take a non-environmental analogue, while the e¤orts of Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) over the last 30 years have substantially heightened the social vili…cation faced by people caught driving under the in ‡uence of alcohol, it still requires the police to pull-over and breathalyze miscreants.
The regulator in the model maximizes welfare (equally-weighted sum of compliance and operating costs and environmental damage), while the NGO usually overweighs environmental outcomes. This implies that there is tension between the two; they are not aligned in their preferred outcomes. The strategic interaction between the regulator and NGO in this set-up, and the properties of the resulting pattern of incentives that they jointly-produce, is our focus.
The rest of the paper is set out as follows.
In Section 2 we develop and solve a stylized model of the game between EPA and NGO.
The key assumptions embedded in the model are: (a) formal penalties are limited (in fact zero) so that the state regulator must rely on social penalties (social disapproval) to discourage polluting behavior; 4 (b) the primary tool available to the regulator is information provision; 2 A social penalty might take various form and the precise form is not important to us here. Gunningham et al (2004: 321) ) report that: "Managers at BC4 told us that the sanction they feared most for breaching regulations were not legal but informal sanctions imposed by the public and the media, they were motivated less by avoiding regulatory violations per se than by avoiding 'anything that could give you a bad name'". Econometric evidence of the substantial size of social penalties is provided by Badrinath and Bolster (1996) , and Pargal and Wheeler (1996) amongst others. 3 We use the term 'bad behavior' loosely -it may or may not correspond to a …rm's failure to satisfy a formal legal requirement. The literature on community right-to-know provisions in general and the US Toxic Release Inventory in particular demonstrates the potential power of information provision in this context. In Canada, the "environmental scorecard" published by the BC provincial government outlining environmental performance indicators was, according to one mill manager "a pretty e¤ective tool. If you have recurring environmental problems you come up on the list. That keeps you in compliance because public pressure is more demanding than the regulatory agencies" (Gunningham et al (2004: 330) ). 4 Reputation here, however, is a social construct rather than something that emerges from a Bayesian updating process. This parallels Abito, Besanko and Diermeier (2015: 5): "Our notion of reputation is consistent with that employed in the sociology and management literatures -it is a social construct re ‡ecting the public's subjective attitudes towards a company (Bermiss, Zajac and King (2013) . It is not a posterior (c) the hostility of the social atmosphere into which evidence of wrong-doing is published can be in ‡uenced by attitude-leadership by an NGO; and (d) the EPA and NGO may have di¤erent objectives -in particular the latter overweighs environmental outcomes over industry interests -and are strategic in how they behave.
An insight of the model is that in making decisions about how much e¤ort to invest in a hostile social atmosphere, the strategic NGO will have regard not only to the direct e¤ect on …rms, but also to the induced changes in the actions of the EPA -it's 'partner'in the creation of social pressure. The e¢ cacy of its own actions to whip-up a more hostile social atmosphere may be o¤-set if the EPA responds by scaling back the intensity of its own informationprovision e¤orts. 5 In other circumstances the EPA may be induced to expand that intensity, and the NGO will be motivated to push even harder to exploit such crowding-in e¤ects. In parallel the EPA, as a strategic actor in its own right, will realize that the intensity of the information provision program that it operates will in ‡uence the incentive that the NGO has to invest in a hostile community atmosphere. We characterize the reaction functions in the game between EPA and NGO. As in Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) , and as the discussion in the previous paragraph suggests, critical to incentives in any given context turn out to be whether EPA and NGO intensity choices are strategic complements or substitutes. This depends in turn on a constellation of parameters. Taxonomic in character, the model generates numerous new insights that are inevitably missing from analyses (the existing literature) that fail to recognize that social pressures are jointly-produced by state and non-governmental actors.
While the taxonomy is insightful, providing as it does the …rst rigorous treatment of the joint production of social pressure, in Section 3 we use it as a building block to think about strategic delegation in activism. In particular we treat the NGO's objective function -the weight that the NGO places on environmental as opposed to non-environmental outcomesas an institution-design parameter that it can choose in a pre-game. We caricature this as appointing an NGO 'chief'of a particular disposition, but the weight can equally be thought of as embedded in the practices and protocols within an NGO that determine its advocacy choices. 6 belief about hidden information as in a model with informed and uninformed players". 5 EPA thought process: "If the social atmosphere is such that every revealed wrong-doer faces an enormous social penalty, then to maximise welfare we only need to catch and reveal wrong-doing with small probability". 6 Major environmental advocacy groups are widely-understood to vary in how sensitive they are to business interests, which in turn shapes their demands (Yaziji and Doh (2009) 
Model

Setup
Consider an industry made up of a large number of …rms. Each …rm makes a binary decision to engage in behavior that is either 'good'(a = 1) or 'bad'(a = 0). For convenience we will use the terms compliance (a = 1) and non-compliance (a = 0) as equivalents, but that should be understood to have wider interpretation than satisfaction of some formal legal requirement.
Compliance is costly for the …rms with cost represented by c. Firms are heterogenous -they vary in how costly they …nd it to behave well -and c is distributed according to distribution function F with corresponding density function f . The …rm knows the realized value c, but others know only the distribution F from which it is drawn. For simplicity we restrict attention to the case in which c is uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. The taxonomy that we develop turns out to be very rich, so it is unlikely that allowing for a more general distribution would deliver more insight.
There are two entities that between them determine the incentives facing …rms to comply: an EPA and an NGO. These two "regulators" have di¤erent instruments and di¤erent objectives. Social penalties are jointly-produced by their actions. In general, the coercive tools available to it mean that the EPA has a comparative advantage in information gathering (through inspection programs, mandatory disclosure requirements, and so on) and NGOs in in ‡uencing community attitudes towards bad behavior. The relationship between the EPA and NGO is symbiotic. The NGO relies on the EPA to identify badly behaving …rms. The EPA needs the NGO to use its in ‡uence to 'whip-up'public anger towards this particular type of bad behavior. The EPA and NGO understand that they are strategically interdependent and interact non-cooperatively. It is worth making explicit here that we do not analyse the case in which multiple NGOs co-exist and may compete (or collaborate) in pursuing their various objectives.
The EPA operates an information regime -which for shorthand we will call an inspection policy -which detects non-compliance with probability p. Inspection is costly for the EPA, with an associated cost function (p), where is increasing and convex in p and 0 (0) = 0.
To generate closed-form solutions of the game we will adopt a quadratic cost assumption;
(p) = 1=2 p 2 , with 0 < < 1. In some settings if the EPA detects non-compliance the …rm may have to pay a formal penalty or …ne . However these …nes are often small and not in themselves su¢ cient to create enough "audit pressure" to motivate compliance among all …rms. In order to focus on social or informal penalties, and the strategic interaction between the EPA and the NGO, we set = 0, i.e. there is no penalty for non-compliance from the EPA.
The assumption that = 0 is worth re ‡ecting on here. In many practical settings penalties that the EPA has at their disposal, while likely not zero, can be comparatively small, and
certainly short of what would be needed to ensure full-compliance with the rules that they police. This will not apply, of course, in every industry or every jurisdiction. The assumption of restricted penalties is a fairly common one in the regulatory enforcement literature (for some important early examples see Harrington (1988) , Heyes (1996) sharp separation of powers between the EPA and NGO in our model which we believe to be helpful. In Heyes and Oestreich (2018), the online Appendix to this paper, we establish that relaxing this assumption has little impact on the qualitative results.
The NGO has no capacity to audit …rms -it relies on information from the informationgathering endeavours of the EPA. However it is able to in ‡uence public opinion, that is create a negative reaction by social-minded citizens if the …rm is shown to be out of compliance.
This results in a negative payo¤ or social penalty to the …rm denoted by . That social penalty is the …nancial value associated with the diminution of social license. But in ‡uencing public attitudes is costly for the NGO -it may have to run adverts, print lea ‡ets, engage in educative and persuasive campaigns to sensitize people to the issue at hand. The size of the social penalty depends on the costly e¤orts by the NGO, re ‡ected by cost function ( ),
where is increasing and convex in and 0 (0) = 0. We will use the following quadratic cost function ( ) = 1=2 2 , with 0 < < 1, to ensure closed-form solutions. Variable can be thought of as the society level of "alertness" towards NGO messaging. When is small, a society is "alert"towards an issue and it is relatively cheap for the NGO to in ‡uence public attitudes; when is large, a society is "inattentive"towards an issue and it is relatively expensive for the NGO to in ‡uence public attitudes. That NGO cost is assumed insensitive to prevalence of non-compliance in the regulated population re ‡ects our focus on the role of an NGO in inducing social contempt for a particular sort of behavior (such as drink driving, failure of a …rm to pay minimum wage or to dispose of waste product legally), rather than against a particular non-compliance incident.
Firms and regulators move in sequence. At stage one, …rms decide whether or not to comply with the standard. One can think of this as a …rm making investment or product design decisions, adopting management practices, that are either good or bad for society. At stage two, EPA and NGO choose simultaneously the inspection probability and the social atmosphere into which the audit reports are published. 7 Industry Consider a …rm of type c. The payo¤ when complying with the standard is (a = 1) = c, while the …rm's payo¤ for non-compliance and instead facing the expected social penalty in case of detection is (a = 0) = p . Hence, a …rm does comply if:
c p : Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution function F (c) and the fraction of …rms that will comply and those that will not comply with the standard. Given the uniform distribution of c, the probability that a …rm complies is Pr(c p ), i.e.: F (p ) = p . Hence, the expected fraction of …rms that comply is p and the expected fraction of …rms that do not comply is
(1 p ). This seems to use the most natural sequence of events. In some setting it may be more appropriate to think of the EPA moving …rst and with commitment power. In Heyes and Oestreich (2018) we establish that modeling in this alternative way has almost no e¤ect on the qualitative results of the analysis. We are grateful to a referee for encouraging us to test the robustness of results to this change. 8 Lyon (2012) writes "Perhaps the most important reward o¤ered by NGOs is public endorsement of a corporation's environmental actions through a partnership with that company. [..] Perhaps the most important harms wielded by NGOs are the threat of a consumer boycott of a …rm's products and, more generally, the sullying of a …rm's reputation in the media." In essence the model at hand captures the second, but not the …rst e¤ect. However, consider the following extension: If audited and found to be in compliance, the …rm bene…ts because the NGO has directed the public atmosphere accordingly. Thus, while represents the social penalty created by an NGO, a fraction of is added to the …rm's pro…ts in case to be found in compliance such as , where < 1. The key inequality c p describing industry behaviour would change to c + p p or c p (1 ). The current model concentrates on the special case in which = 0.
EPA The EPA's objective is to minimize a social loss function W which comprises …rms' compliance costs, the environmental damage associated with cases of non-compliance, the costs of the NGO and the costs of inspections.
Note, the costs c of all complying …rms are in the interval [0; p ] so that the …rms'expected cost of compliance is the expected value of c in [0; p ]. That is,
The fraction of …rms that do not comply (1 p ) cause social damage D(:) which is increasing and convex. For tractability we assume quadratic damages;
Putting all this together, the EPA chooses detection probability p in order to minimize the social loss function W :
In raising p the EPA trades-o¤ the lower damages resulting from the higher number of …rms in compliance against higher costs to the industry and higher enforcement cost. In the following, we focus on interior solutions. In the Nash outcome the EPA will take the social atmosphere created by the NGO as given. The …rst-order condition @W=@p = 0 is given by:
The …rst-order condition leads to the best-response function (BRF) for the audit rate p for any given social atmosphere chosen by the NGO:
We note in passing that a second order su¢ cient condition for a cost minimum @W 2 =@ 2 p < 0 is satis…ed. Inspecting the best-response function of the EPA (2) leads to:
The audit rate p selected by the EPA is increasing in the severity of environmental damage and decreasing in the cost of inspection . It is non-monotonic in the prevailing social atmosphere : If is small, an increase in it induces the EPA to increase inspection intensity (actions are strategic complements). If is large, an increase in it induces the EPA to decrease inspection intensity (actions are strategic substitutes).
The result that p is increasing in and it is decreasing in is intuitive: The more severe the environmental damage associated with non-compliance the higher the audit rate p. In contrast, the more costly it is for the EPA to conduct audits, the lower the audit rate.
The impact of on p is interesting as it is non-monotonic as described by the Proposition.
In fact, p( ) has a maximum where @p( )=@ = 0 which occurs at:
That means, if the social penalty is relatively small, i.e.: < , p is a strategic complement for and if the penalty is large, i.e.: > , p is a strategic substitute for . Put di¤erently: there are two o¤setting impacts when the NGO increases . On the one hand, a larger increases the marginal e¤ectiveness of information provision by the EPA. Because its instrument becomes more e¤ective, the EPA may choose to use it more. On the other hand, increasing , means that the industry becomes subject to further scrutiny, which, at some point, may be too large from the point of view of the EPA. In that case, the EPA may contract its own e¤orts.
We will see below that the equilibrium value can be smaller or larger than . That means, the equilibrium actions of the EPA to the actions of the NGO can be strategic complements or strategic substitutes. This non-monotonicity turns out to have important implications for how keen the NGO will be to devote e¤ort to developing a more hostile social atmosphere.
Beyond some point it recognizes that its own e¤orts to generate harder incentives for good behavior are partly-or fully-o¤set by the induced decrease in the inspection intensity chosen by the EPA. We operationalize this by saying that the objective function of an NGO is a weighted sum of environmental damage and compliance costs to the industry, but the NGO always over-weights environmental outcomes in comparison to the EPA (this is what makes it an environmental NGO). Finally, the NGO cares about its own campaigning cost. So for a given audit rate p the problem of the NGO is to choose social penalty in order to minimize the loss function Z:
The parameter 2 [0; 1=2) is the weight on industry costs -a lower value of is associated with an NGO that places greater weight on environmental quality; in other words the NGO is 'deeper'green. 9 For some NGOs, = 0 which is the case when the NGO does not care about industry costs at all. For now we take that value as exogenous, later we explore how an NGO might wish to manipulate it strategically and instrumentally to further progress its goals.
In raising the NGO trades-o¤ the reduced damages from the smaller number of …rms in non-compliance against higher industry costs and higher enforcement cost. The …rst-order condition @Z=@ = 0 is given by:
The …rst-order condition leads to the BRF for the social penalty for any given audit rate p chosen by the EPA:
We note in passing that a second order su¢ cient condition for a cost minimum @Z 2 =@ 2 < 0 is satis…ed. Inspecting the best-response function of the NGO (3) leads to the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 The social atmosphere implemented by the NGO is increasing in the severity of environmental damage and decreasing in the cost of inspection and weight . It is 9 We thank two anonymous referees for the question of robustness of our main results when the EPA's cost factor into the NGO's loss function. One referee has noted that the modeling choices made with regard to the EPA and NGO objective functions introduce a particular type of asymmetry. While the EPA weighs the costs of the NGO, the NGO attaches no weight to the costs incurred by the EPA. While we retain this as our preferred speci…cation in the body of the manuscript, we establish in Heyes and Oestreich (2018) that relaxing this assumption -assuming that the NGO internalize, to some extent, the costs of the EPA -has little impact on results.
non-monotonic in the intensity of the EPA's inspection intensity: If p is small, an increase in it induces the NGO to increase social penalty (actions are strategic complements). If p is large, an increase in it induces the NGO to reduce the social penalty (actions are strategic substitutes).
These results deliver the best-response function of the NGO. The social penalty is increasing in the severity of damage and it is decreasing in the cost of auditing and weight . The intuition is straight-forward: the more costly it is for the NGO to create the social penalty or the more the NGO cares about the bottom line of …rms, the lower the created social penalty. Also, the more severe the damages from non-compliance the higher the social penalty .
The impact of p on is interesting as it is non-monotonic as described by the Proposition.
In fact, (p) has a maximum where @ (p)=@p = 0, which is equivalent to:
We will see below that the equilibrium value p can be smaller or larger than p. That means, the equilibrium actions of the EPA can be strategic complements or strategic substitutes. In other words, if the audit rate is relatively small, i.e.: p < p, is a strategic complement for p and if the audit rate is large, i.e.: p > p, is a strategic substitute for p. Put di¤erently: there are two o¤setting impacts when the EPA increases p. On the one hand, a larger p increases the marginal e¤ectiveness of social penalization by the NGO. Because its instrument becomes more e¤ective, the NGO may choose to use it more. On the other hand, increasing p, means that the industry becomes subject to further scrutiny, which, at some point, may be too large even from the point of view of the NGO (unless = 0). In that case, the EPA may contract its own e¤orts.
Taxonomy of Strategies
The Nash Equilibrium (NE) occurs where the two best-response functions of the EPA (2) and the best-response function of the NGO (3) intersect, i.e. at the equilibrium, there is no incentive to deviate for either entity. *** Figure 2 here *** Figure 2 illustrates the NE p and and the maxima of the two best-response functions p and respectively. We can anticipate that the signs of the slopes of the respective players' reactions functions are likely to dictate the properties of any particular NE, so it is natural to let the maxima of the best-response functions (which we will denote p and ) partition the action set of EPA and NGO into four quadrants. Depending on context -as described by di¤erent constellations of parameters -the NE may occur in quadrant I, II or III based on parameter values. We are able to rule out the possibility that it occurs in quadrant IV .
In section IV the EPA actions are strategic complements and the NGO actions are strategic substitutes. However, given that the NGO overweights environmental interests it can never be optimal for the NGO to decrease activities (when EPA increases its own activities) in a situation where EPA would increase activities (when NGO increases its activities).
In the case illustrated in Figure 2 , for example, the NE is in section III. Here, the actions of the NGO are strategic complements in the vicinity of equilibrium. That means, the more the EPA audits the …rms (increasing p), the higher the NGO chooses the social penalty to be (the more heavily it invests in whipping up community hostility). Equally, if the NGO increases , the EPA response with increasing p. Table 1 shows the other possible strategy combinations of EPA and NGO that could occur in equilibrium.
The policy relevance of these segments can be explained through situations of relative strength and/or weakness of NGO and/or EPA. For instance, sections I and II are re ‡ective of the situation in some developing countries. In these sections, the e¤orts of a well-funded international NGO have come to be more important than governmental enforcement e¤orts. The intuition contained in the taxonomy is relevant for EPA and NGO decision makers alike. Even if they do not have in mind a formal model of the sort presented here, in making its decisions about how much e¤ort to expend on encouraging a hostile social atmosphere a well-functioning NGO should have regard not just to the direct e¤ect on …rms, but also to the induced e¤ect on the behavior of the EPA. The e¢ cacy of its own actions may be o¤-set (for example) if the EPA responds by scaling back the intensity of its own informationprovision e¤orts. Indeed, this is the case if the equilibrium occurs in sections I and II. In other circumstances (section III) the EPA will be induced to expand that intensity, and the NGO will be motivated to push even harder to exploit such crowding-in e¤ects. In parallel the NGO, as a strategic actor in its own right, will realize that the intensity of the information provision program that it operates will in ‡uence the incentive that the NGO has to invest in a hostile community atmosphere.
The taxonomy also allows us to think systematically about the comparative static impacts of changing various parameters. For instance, consider a change in the preferences of the NGO in terms of , i.e. how much the NGO cares about environmental costs in comparison to industry cost. We know from the analysis of the best-response functions (BRFs) that the NGO's BRF is decreasing in , while the EPA's BRF is not a¤ected by . Referring to Figure   1 we can infer e.g. how the equilibrium outcomes change when the NGO internalizes more/less of industry costs. If the compliance atmosphere is re ‡ected by a NE in sections I and II, the more the NGO cares about industry pro…t, the less social penalty it will create but the more intensively will the EPA audit in equilibrium. In contrast, if the NE is in quadrant III, the more the NGO cares about industry pro…t, the less social penalty it will create, and the less the EPA will audit.
Equilibrium
In this section, we derive the closed-form solution to the above game between the EPA and the NGO when both regulators behave non-cooperatively. The solution is found by inverting the two best-response functions (2) and (3).
Proposition 3
The solution to the game between the EPA and the NGO is:
where
Special Case For tractability, we restrict our attention to one special case of the general model above. Since our primary focus here is on the characteristics and behaviors of the NGO we will hold constant the level of environmental damages at = 1 and EPA costs at = 1=2.
We continue to capture the cost of the NGO as 0 < < 1 so that we still analyse relevant situations where EPA cost is relatively larger or smaller than EPA cost depending on the atmosphere in the society towards a particular social issue.
For this special case, the solution simpli…es to:
where:
The maximum points in the respective best-response functions are given by:
It is important to note that p can be larger or smaller than p and that can be larger or smaller than depending on parameter values as per our next proposition. We note that (1 ) < 3=4 holds true as per our de…nition of the NGO ( < 1=2). Thus, if < (1 ), the equilibrium is in section II; if (1 ) < < 3=4 , the equilibrium is in section I; and if 3=4 < the equilibrium is in section III of the proposed taxonomy.
The Proof is in the Appendix.
In the vicinity of equilibrium the actions of the EPA and NGO can be strategic substitutes or strategic complements. It is interesting to observe how the equilibrium values for auditing p and social penalty change in relation to p and when varying the exogenous parameters of the model. For instance, for …xed positive , when is small ( < (1 )), the equilibrium is in section II (p > p and > ). That means, the equilibrium actions of EPA and NGO are both strategic substitutes. As increases, the equilibrium changes location counterclockwise (referring to Figure 2 ) from section II to section I (p < p and > ) if is moderate
) and …nally to section III (p < p and < ) for large values of (3=4 < ). That means, always when decreases, the use of increases which is intuitive.
Lower cost to stir-up public anger results in doing so more. The strategic response from the EPA depends on the section the equilibrium is situated in. In section I and II, increasing is responded with decreasing p (the NGO crowds-out EPA activity) and in section III increasing is responded with increasing p (the NGO crowds-in EPA activity). Table 2 summarizes these insights. There are three distinct regulatory environments based on how costly the NGO …nds it to stir-up public anger given the social atmosphere towards the particular issue (captured by parameter 2 (0; 1)) and by how much the NGO cares about the bottom line of …rms (captured by parameter 2 [0; 1=2)). Small means it is rather easy for the NGO to motivate society to levy a public penalty to a non-complying …rm. We call such a society "alert". On the contrary, large means it is rather di¢ cult for the NGO to motivate society to levy a public penalty to a non-complying …rm. We call such a society "inattentive". We call a society "attentive"if it is neither alert nor inattentive. In a stylized way the reader may think of how likely a recipient of a lea ‡et or other message from an NGO is to read it, and therefore how intensive a communication program the NGO has to mount in order to 'get its message across'.
Furthermore, we call the NGO to be "green" if is relatively small, that is the NGO cares very little about the bottom line of …rms but instead it is only concerned with the cause. We call the NGO "business-friendly" if is relatively large, that is the NGO cares considerably about the bottom line of …rms and about the cause. Figure 3 illustrates the behavior of EPA and NGO based on and .
*** Figure 3 here *** Our taxonomy delivers several new insights, as "real-world"regulatory contexts can plausibly be sorted into the taxonomy outlined in Figure 3 .
To take a couple of examples, if society is su¢ ciently inattentive ( > 3=4), the equilibrium is necessarily situated in section III, where more EPA activity is responded by more NGO activity and vice versa more NGO activity induces more EPA activity. This is re ‡ective of "real-world" situations where EPAs and NGOs are "partners for the cause". If society is very attentive about the issue and the NGO is very green, the equilibrium tends to be in section I, where more EPA activity induces more NGO activity, but more NGO activity causes a reduction in EPA activity. This is re ‡ective of "real-world" situations in some developing nations where EPAs and NGOs are "opponents"in that the EPA would rather hinder the work of the more "radical"(hostile to business) NGO. Other cases can be read o¤ and interpreted analogously.
Strategic Delegation: The Optimal NGO Chief
An interesting feature that the taxonomy makes transparent is that outcomes -both environmental, and equilibrium e¤orts by state regulator and NGO -are sensitive to the NGOs objective function. In particular to , the relative weight placed on environmental versus economic cost impacts, or how business-burden-sensitive (brown) the NGO is in its decision- The leadership of NGOs include former CEOs of companies or global civic leaders -perhaps in executive functions, or perhaps on boards of control. In exercising discretion they can be expected to vary in how they trade-o¤ business and economic interests against environmental outcomes. That is the leadership of an NGO can vary in how deep a shade of green it is in the way in which it makes operational decisions. A forward-looking NGO donor can reasonably be expected to account for such strategic considerations when deciding how to assign donations.
We will show that such a NGO donor typically prefers a delegate with a di¤erent to his or her own. 10 We could alternatively think of a single large founder (Bill Gates) about to give a million dollars to a green foundation but setting the rules/byelaws/board composition of the foundation …rst. For the rest of this section we will talk of a single donor, but the distinction is semantic.
If the true tastes or objectives of the donor are described by true , what sort of chief would they want running the NGO (which we will denote del )? The objective of a founder with true objective captured by true is to choose del to maximize
with equilibrium actions of EPA p and NGO themselves depending on del .
Using p ( del ) from (4) and ( del ) from (5) and deriving @Z=@ del = 0 given true (…rst-order condition) implicitly de…nes the mapping from true to del . The resulting function del ( true ) is complex and we investigate some of its relevant characteristics in the Appendix.
Based on this investigation, we gain the following insights.
Recall …rst, that a truly green NGO donor features true = 0. The next proposition establishes the link between true and del for a truly green NGO donor.
Proposition 5 A deep green donor (one with tastes described by true = 0) will delegate to an NGO chief with the same tastes as herself ( del = 0) if society is su¢ ciently inattentive, in particular if = 3=4. She delegates to one less green than herself ( del > 0) if society is su¢ ciently alert ( < 3=4).
When a green donor ( true = 0) truthfully delegates del = 0 and society is su¢ ciently alert ( < 3=4), the equilibrium occurs in section I of the Taxonomy of Strategies of EPA and NGO. In section I the EPA actions are strategic substitutes: less NGO activity induces more EPA activity. In this situation, it is optimal for the donor to delegate to an NGO chief who is more business-friendly than the donor, del > 0. This is because the best-response function of the NGO (p) is decreasing in del which is strategically responded by the EPA with increasing p (which in turn helps to achieve the objective of the green NGO). Thus, the increase in EPA e¤orts partially o¤sets the decrease in NGO e¤orts while the NGO saves costly resources.
Put di¤erently, in this setting the truly green NGO donor exploits the strategic setting by delegating to an NGO chief that is more business friendly than the donor.
When a truly green NGO donor ( true = 0) truthfully delegates del = 0 and faces a society that is inattentive towards the issue ( = 3=4), the equilibrium occurs in section III of the Taxonomy of Strategies of EPA and NGO. In section III both the EPA actions and the NGO actions are strategic complements: less NGO activity is responded by less EPA activity. In this situation, it is optimal for the NGO donor to delegate sincerely (appoint an NGO chief with the same preferences as the donor). In other words del = 0, the NGO chief will not be business-friendly. In order to understand the intuition behind this result, we observe that if the founder were instead to delegate some del > 0 the best-response function of the NGO (p) would decrease leading to lower and lower p in equilibrium, contrary to the founder's ultimate objective.
Next, note that a "business-friendly" NGO donor features true ! 1=2 ( is marginally lower than 1=2). The next proposition establishes the link between true and del for a businessfriendly NGO donor.
Proposition 6 A business-friendly donor (one with tastes described by true ! 1=2) will delegate to an NGO chief with the same tastes as herself ( del ! 1=2) if society is su¢ ciently alert ( < 1=4). She delegates to one more green than herself ( del < 0) if society is attentive or inattentive ( = 1=4).
We note that a business-friendly NGO donor still overweighs environmental over business outcomes compared to the EPA. Such a donor is also interested to free-ride on EPA e¤orts which are free of charge to the NGO. Thus, the donor uses strategic delegation to crowd-in EPA e¤orts whenever suitable.
When a business-friendly founder ( true ! 1=2) truthfully delegates del ! 1=2 and society is su¢ ciently alert ( < 1=4), the equilibrium occurs in section II of the Taxonomy of Strategies of EPA and NGO. In section II the EPA actions are strategic substitutes: more NGO activity induces less EPA activity. In this situation, it is optimal for the donor to delegate sincerely (appoint an NGO chief who's tastes replicate the ones of the donor). In other words del ! 1=2, the NGO chief will also be business-friendly. To see why we can observe that if the businessfriendly founder were instead to delegate a more green mission ( del < 1=2), NGO activity would increase and subsequently EPA activity p would decrease which is contrary to the objective of the NGO founder.
When a business-friendly founder ( true ! 1=2) truthfully delegates del ! 1=2 and society is su¢ ciently inattentive ( = 1=4), the equilibrium occurs in section III of the Taxonomy of Strategies of EPA and NGO. In section III both the EPA actions and the NGO actions are strategic complements: more NGO activity is responded by more EPA activity. In this situation, it is optimal for the NGO donor to delegate a more green mission. This would result in increasing NGO activity and also in increasing EPA activity. Again the NGO donor free-rides on EPA e¤orts and strategically crowds-in EPA e¤orts.
Until now, we have focused on two special cases in terms of NGO characteristics: (i) true = 0 and (ii) del ! 1=2. Next, we analyze more general cases of true . Figure 4 illustrates the complete mapping from true to del , i.e. the function del ( true ) for various levels of . *** Figure 4 here ***
The mapping of the true NGO type into the delegated type del ( true ) is insightful. We observe from Figure 4 that a su¢ ciently green NGO donor (small true ) who faces a su¢ ciently alert society (small to medium ) delegates to a more business friendly (brown) NGO chief.
The NGO donor does this in order to crowd-in EPA activity as the equilibrium is in sections I or II. The NGO donor delegates to be more brown and subsequently lowers which saves the NGO costly resources while the EPA increases its activity which helps to achieve the true objective of the NGO. We note that the smaller the larger tends to be the di¤erence between del and true .
We also observe from Figure 4 that a su¢ ciently brown NGO donor (large true ) who faces an inattentive or attentive society (medium to large ) delegates more green missions. The NGO donor does this in order to crowd-in EPA activity as the equilibrium is in sections III.
The NGO donor delegates to be more green and subsequently increases which is responded by EPA increasing her activity which helps to achieve the objective of the NGO. We note that the smaller the larger tends to be the di¤erence between del and true .
*** Figure 5 here ***
The outcomes from the mapping of true to del can also be illustrated with the help of the framework of our regulatory taxonomy introduced above. Figure 5 shows that all NGO donors which face an inattentive society ( = 3=4) delegate a more green mission. The same is true for brown NGO donors facing an attentive or inattentive community. The NGO does this in order to crowd-in EPA activity as the equilibrium is in section III. The donor delegates in such a way as to be less business-friendly and subsequently increases which cost the NGO resources, but there is some leverage for these resources. This is because the increase in encourages the EPA to increase its activity in turn -due to strategic complementarity in this range -which further contributes to the true objective of the NGO donor. In other words, if the NGO has high cost of causing public anger, delegation is always to a deeper green mission.
We further …nd that the larger the more green is the delegated mission.
Note that there are moderate levels of (i.e.: = 1=2) where a relatively green NGO donor ( true < 1=4) delegates to a browner-than-self NGO chief; a relatively brown NGO founder ( true > 1=4) delegates to a greener-than-self NGO chief. In each case, the NGO founder uses strategic delegation to commit to being "more moderate".
Another interesting element of Figure 5 is the "truthful-delegation-envelope." Along this envelope, the NGO donor hires an NGO chief who has tastes that coincide with her own.
For instance, a brown NGO donor (
if society is relatively alert ( 1=4). Everywhere else, optimal delegation is strategic in character.
Conclusions
When a donor -big or small -gives money to an environmental NGO she is in e¤ect delegating her advocacy 'bidding'to that NGO. It is therefore natural to ask what sort of surrogate the donor wants to act in his or her stead. This paper shows that NGO donors typically want to delegate their bidding to an NGO which trades-o¤ business versus environmental outcomes di¤erently in comparison to themselves.
Social pressure upon …rms is determined endogenously in the model that we have developed, and is jointly produced between a state regulator and an NGO. Recognizing this coproduction of social pressure by di¤erent actors with di¤erent instruments and di¤erent objectives turns out to be critical to understanding the incentives for good corporate behavior that will emerge. In our stylized set-up the interactions between the EPA and civil NGO turn out to be complex and nuanced. Re ‡ecting this we develop a taxonomy of social enforcement settings into which real-world environmental regulatory contexts can in principal be categorized. Central to the analysis is that each player recognizes and anticipates the impact of their own behaviors on the behavior of their coproducer. An NGO will have little interest in investing more e¤ort to whip-up public angst, for example, if the EPA responds to that extra e¤ort by scaling back the intensity of its own information-provision. Its pressure-generating e¤orts would, in that case, be o¤-set or 'crowded out' by the induced reaction. Equally a welfare-motivated public actor will be sensitive to the virulence of the social atmosphere into which it disseminates information.
We illustrate how the taxonomy can be used to shed light on the important phenomena of strategic delegation, and the leadership of NGOs that advocacy donors will …nd attractive.
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In particular, how hostile to or collaborative with business will a donor want the NGO to be?
To borrow the terminology that is the organizing theme of Lyon's (2012) book -should she or he appoint a good cop or bad cop? Importantly the solutions have regard to the strategic interdependence that quite obviously exists between the pressure-generating actions of the state agency and that of civil society organizations, which has been ignored in existing work. The analysis provides a framework within which to think about how the state and the donor contributions in ‡uence the incentives for environmental and social good practice.
There are various ways in which the analysis might usefully be extended. One would be to provide a more explicit micro-foundation to how exactly the NGO generates social penalty.
A second would be to allow for the coexistence of multiple NGOs with perhaps competing objectives. A third would be to consider, in a repeated setting, the role that reputation might play in insulating …rm's found to be behaving badly from subsequent social sanction. Second, p > p is equivalent to condition @ (p) @p < 0 evaluated at equilibrium. The BRF is:
(p) = p(1 ) p 2 + and the relevant derivative is: > (1 ) is true because < 1=2.
Proof of Proposition 5 and Proposition 6
The objective of a founder with true objective captured by true is to choose del to maximize: for some example values of : for ! 0 (lower envelope), for ! 1 (upper envelope) and also for = f1=4; 1=2; 3=4g.
*** Figure 6 here *** if NGO costs are relatively low ( < 1=4). This proves Proposition 6.
The insights above allow to derive Figure 4 for del ( true ) in the main paper. and also for = f1=4; 1=2; 3=4g.
